In times of scal stress governments fail to adjust scal policy in line with the requirements for debt sustainability. Under those circumstances monetary policy impacts the probability of sovereign default alongside ination dynamics. Uribe (2006) studies the relationship between ination and sovereign defaults with a model in which the central bank controls the risky interest rate; he concludes that low ination can only be maintained if the government sometimes defaults. This paper follows Uribe (2006) by examining monetary policy that controls the risky interest rate; however, it diers by the baseline assumption about the central bank's objectives. In this paper, monetary policy is not a pure ination targeting: the central bank minimizes the probability of default while ruling out large ination hikes. An advantage of this framework is that it avoids the issue of zero risk premium that exists in Uribe (2006) but allows a study of the relationship between the constraints on the monetary policy, default risk and the risk premium.
Sovereign defaults are associated with devastating consequences for thenancial system. Ensuring the stability of the nancial system is one of the key functions of a central bank. When government debt is nominated in national currency, the central bank is capable of resolving debt sustainability issues by causing the costs of debt servicing to be reduced. Uribe (2006) shows that in the presence of sovereign default risks, two fundamental functions of the central bank are in conict: ensuring debt sustainability (stability of the nancial system) and maintaining low ination. In the litera- 1 , the authors presuppose that the primary goal of the central bank is to avoid sovereign defaults, regardless of the costs in terms of ination. Rational agents are aware of the central bank's preferences and thus believe that the probability of default is zero. It follows that in those models there is no risk premium on government bonds.
By contrast, Uribe (2006) and Guillard, Kempf (2012) study the case when maintaining low ination is a primary objective of the central bank -monetary policy is conducted in a way that excludes deviations of ination from the target.
In these models defaults emerge whenever debt becomes unsustainable under the target level of ination.
In this paper, the baseline assumption is that although the central bank is eager to minimize the probability of default arising from scal stress, it is constrained by formal requirements concerning ination: there is a maximum level of ination that the central bank may allow to avoid sovereign default.
This specication of the central bank's problem can be viewed as a compromise between baseline assumptions of FTPL models and models in which the central bank does not allow any deviations of ination from the target, such as Uribe (2006) , Guillard, Kempf (2012) . An advantage of this specication is that it avoids the issue of zero risk premium existing in Uribe (2006) , while at the same time allowing a study of the capabilities and limitations of monetary policy 1 Leeper (1991) , Woodford (1995 Woodford ( , 1998 , Cochrane (2001) and others.
aimed at mitigating default risks.
We determine the threshold value of real debt that triggers sovereign default and show that this threshold is an increasing function of the upper limit on ination. We then show that under this specication of monetary policy the equilibrium risk premium and probability of default depend on the upper limit of ination -the higher the limit, the lower the risk premium and the probability of default. When the upper limit on ination is high enough, monetary policy that controls the risky interest rate can ensure a zero probability of default in equilibrium. Furthermore, if agents do not possess exact information concerning ination constraint, the central bank has incentives to create inaccurate beliefs suggesting the upper limit on ination to be higher than the actual value in order to lower the risk premium on government bonds and reduce the probability of default. Another implication of this analysis: when the central bank is committed to mitigating default risks even if it means higher ination, the earlier the public learns about this commitment, the lower are the costs of implementing such a policy.
Fiscal stress in the EMU
Our specication of the central bank's problem seems particularly relevant for the analysis of monetary policy within a monetary union. When the central bank of a monetary union conducts accommodative policy intended to stabilize the debt of one of the member regions, the costs in terms of ination are spread across all member regions. Fiscally prudent governments may be unwilling to share these costs and thus may have an incentive to collectively impose an upper limit on ination, restricting the central bank's policy choices.
2 Alternatively, the central bank may determine the upper limit on ination by comparing the costs associated with an increase in ination with the costs arising from a sovereign default of one of the member states.
3 Finally, the upper limit on ination may be treated as a formal commitment of the central bank.
A study of monetary policy that controls the costs of borrowing appears to be urgent in light of the recently launched OMT program (Outright Monetary Transactions), a program presupposing that the European Central Bank would buy bonds of troubled governments to mitigate default risks given that they implement scal austerity.
In the EMU, the ability of the governments to exibly adjust scal policy in line with the sustainability criteria is debatable. Trabandt, Uhlig (2011) show that over the past 20 years, European economies have drawn closer to the peaks 2 This outcome seems reasonable if scal policy diers across regions. For instance, if the probability of default is rather small in the majority of regions, costs associated with an increase in ination for these regions exceed benets from reduction of the probability of default resulting from an increase in the upper limit of ination. 3 Cooper, Kempf, Peled (2010) show that in a monetary union the decision of the central bank on whether to bailout a member state or not depends on the allocation of risky bond holdings across regions. Since monetization leads to ination growth, allocation of risky bonds might as well inuence the maximum value of ination that the central bank can tolerate to avoid defaults. of their respective Laer curves: the scope of raising extra tax revenues via increases in tax rates is limited since further increases in the tax rate would cause only a minor gain in a government's earnings. Cochrane (2011a) asserts that even if an economy is supposed to operate well below the Laer curve peak, a small rise in the tax rate may cause a prominent slowdown of economic growth thereby reducing future taxable income. Bi, Leeper, Leith (2012) show that expectations of increases in scal surpluses may have a dierent impact on output growth depending on the composition of scal consolidation. Particularly, expectations of an increase in the labor tax rate lead to a slowdown of output growth, whereas a decrease in government expenditures promotes it. Even if tax collection capacities are to be neglected, it is plausible that a government facing a debt sustainability constraint would rather default on its debt than perform scal contraction even though such a move would facilitate debt service.
Theoretical support for this view can be found in Eaton, Gersovitz (1981) , who determine the eective tax rate -the highest rate it makes sense to impose before defaulting -which turns out to be lower than the rate corresponding to the Laer curve peak.
Thus, austere tax policy has certain limitations. The scope of raising revenues through cutting transfers and government expenditures is limited as well.
First, in a democratic environment it is dicult to implement such a policy without a substantial delay (see Alesina and Drazen, 1991) . Second, due to adverse demographic trends on the one hand and the governments' obligations to support future retirees with appropriate benets on the other, expenditures related to aging are expected to rise substantially in the next 50 years. According to the IMF (2009), the net present value of these promised expenses is averaging 409% of GDP across advanced G-20 countries, meaning that the transfers are not backed by tax revenues. These concerns show that scal stress is likely to remain a pressing issue in a long run.
Section 2 presents the model: it lays out the design of scal policy and the household's problem. We determine conditions insuring that government debt can be sold to households and describe the central bank's problem. In Section 3 we dene equilibrium, determine conditions under which equilibrium exists, and express the default rate, the probability of default and the risk premium as functions of the risky interest rate. In Section 4 we determine conditions guaranteeing that the solution to the central bank's problem exists and characterize it, determining the risky interest rate. We explore equilibrium outcomes when households know the true value of the upper limit on ination and when they do not know it, so the central bank can form beliefs about its value. Section 5 concludes. Appendix presents a numerical example for Greek economy.
2
The model
The government
Consider an endowment economy where the government collects lump sum taxes, pays transfers and issues one-period bonds. The economy is subject to scal stress: scal surpluses evolve exogenously and do not respond to changes in the real value of government debt as a result, the government fails to insure debt sustainability when the ination rate is particularly low. Using the terminology of Leeper (1991) , scal policy is active . We follow Uribe(2006) by assuming that scal surpluses (taxes minus transfers) follow an AR(1) process:
,s is a steady state value of scal surplus. Government debt is risky: in period t the government defaults on a δ t fraction of its debt. The dynamic budget constraint in period t is given by:
where B t is the nominal debt in period t, P t is the price level, R 
We deriveb t in section 3.1.
The household's problem
A representative household consumes c t and purchases risky and risk-free bonds, B t andD t . Risky bonds are supplied by the government; uncertainty about the return on risky bonds arises due to scal stress: because there is a possibility that the government might default on its debt, the value of risky bonds in period t + 1 is unknown in period t We further assume that whereas households cannot borrow from the government -B t+i ≥ 0 in each period -they may borrow from each other. We assume that private debt contracts are enforceable and private debt is risk-free; household's demand for this debt is given byD t .
4 Let R f t be the gross nominal risk-free interest rate. A household also receives endowment y t and pays the government s t , lump-sum taxes minus transfers.
A household maximizes utility from consumption over an innite horizon,
solving:
subject to :
where
First order conditions for this problem are:
In the subsequent section we specify Euler equations for the risky and riskfree interest rates corresponding to an equilibrium with a non-negative demand for each asset.
Sustainability of government debt and the relation between ination and the default rate
For simplicity assume that endowment y t is constant. As there is no production sector, the resource constraint is given by: c t =ȳ.
In equilibrium risky and risk-free assets must be equally attractive for consumers. Since households are identical, equilibrium private borrowing must equal zero. The nancial market equilibrium is given by:
We derive equilibrium conditions for the risky and risk-free interest rates from rst order conditions (8) and (9):
Analogously to transversality condition (5) there is a no-Ponzi game condition for government debt:
where b t+j = B t+j /P t+j is the real value of government debt. When condition (13) is violated, the discounted innite sum of expected government expenditures plus debt exceeds the discounted sum of expected revenues -under these conditions rational households would not buy newly issued government bonds.
We iterate the dynamic budget constraint of the government (2) and apply
Euler equation (11), obtaining:
Combining (13) and (14), we derive a condition guaranteeing that the government does not engage in Ponzi schemes by choosing default rate δ t :
When condition (15) is violated for a set of {s t ; b t−1 ; δ t ; π t ; R t−1 }, the debt b t , the debt that nances the operational decit in period t, cannot be sold to households.
5
Substituting δ t = 0 into (15), we obtain a condition that guarantees that the government debt is sustainable:
As households are rational, the discounted sum of private income must not exceed the discounted sum of private consumption. Thus, in equilibrium the discounted demand for risky assets must approach zero as t approaches innity.
Using equilibrium conditions (10) and (11), we obtain:
Equation (17) guarantees that, on the one hand, the dynamics of b t satises the transversality condition and, on the other hand, consumption choices of households are rational.
When equation (17) holds, the no-Ponzi game condition (13) holds as equality. Analogously to the derivation of condition (15), using (17) we obtain an equilibrium relation between ination and the default rate:
5 See formal proof in sections 3.1.
Qualitative interpretations of equation (18) (18) it follows that under such policy rule, shocks to s t result in non-zero default rates.
Such specication of a monetary policy has a disadvantage: in equilibrium, the default rate becomes negative whenever the value of scal shock exceeds zero. To see this, substitute the expression for δ t from equation (18) 
Equation (19) states that the bigger scal surpluses are, the higher real value of debt can be sustained in equilibrium. Note that when the scal shock is particularly small,
Applying (19) to (18) and assuming that R t−1 = R * = π * /β as in Uribe (2006), we obtain the equilibrium default rate:
Thus, when ε t > 0, the equilibrium default rate is negative. Moreover, it follows from (12) that the implied risk premium is always zero since R
Following Uribe (2006) , this paper also focuses on monetary policy that controls the risky interest rate. However, unlike in Uribe (2006) , our specication of monetary policy implies uncertainty over future ination. Section 4 shows that the equilibrium risk premium and the probability of default are aected by agents' beliefs about the maximum value of ination that the central bank would allow to avoid defaults: in equilibrium, the higher this value is believed to be, the lower is the risk premium.
Now assume that the default rate is xed. By substituting a xed default rate into (18), we uniquely determine ination in period t because the discounted expected sum of surpluses is exogenous. This happens because under a xed default rate and exogenous scal surpluses the transversality condition from the household's problem (13) holds as equality for only one value of π t (and one value of P t , since P t−1 is known in period t) -this particular level of π t realizes as equilibrium. This result is in line with FTPL -the only dierence being that in FTPL the value of δ t is assumed to be zero. By substituting δ t = 0 we obtain the ination rate and the price level, corresponding to the FTPL case:
The 
The central bank
We showed that in times of scal stress there is a negative relation between ination and the default rate (equation (18) the risky interest rate to minimize the expected default rate while insuring that ination would not exceed an upper limit π max which is set exogenously.
Equilibrium
We now turn to the denition of a competitive equilibrium for this economy.
Denition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of sequences
, if: 1. Sequences satisfy:
• Equilibrium condition (18):
• Default rule (3):
• Resource constraint:
• Euler equation for the risk-free interest rate (12):
• Government budget constraint (2):
2. The central bank chooses R * t to minimize the probability of default in period t+1 while maintaining π t ≤ π max . 3. Fiscal surpluses follow (1):
for given B 0 , P 0 .
In Section 3.1 we express the equilibrium value ofb t as a function of {s t , R t−1, π max }; we nd all {b t−1 ; s t ; R t−1 ; π max } such that there exists an equilibrium; assuming further that an equilibrium exists, we express δ t as a function of {b t−1 ; s t ; R t−1 ; π max }. In section 3.2 we use the equilibrium denition ofb t to derive the risk premium in period t − 1 and the probability of default in period t and express them as functions of {b t−1 ; s t−1 ; R t−1 ; π max }. In Section 4 we solve the central bank's optimization problem and study the relation between R t−1 and {b t−1 ; s t−1 ; π max }.
The equilibrium default rate
As shown in Section 2.3, when scal policy cannot adjust its surpluses and ination is xed, equilibrium with positive borrowing is reached through adjustment of the default rate, as in Uribe (2006 Assume that scal variables are such that:
When condition (23) holds, in the absence of default equilibrium ination is lower than π max (from (18)). Thus, scal authority does not have to default on the debt in equilibrium.
Now consider the case in which restriction (23) is violated:
When for given values of b t−1 , R t−1 , s t−1 and ε t relation (24) is true, equilibrium with zero default rate and ination under π max does not exist. Even if ination equals π max -the highest possible value -the government cannot cover current operational decit by issuing new debt because such debt would not be sustainable and cannot be sold on the nancial market. Proposition 1. If for given b t−1 , R t−1 , ε t , s t−1 and δ t = 0 condition (24) holds, debt in period t cannot be sold to households.
Proof . Suppose condition (24) holds. From the government budget constrain (2) we obtain the real value of bonds that the government must issue in period t to nance the operational decit:
From the rst order condition (11), households will be eager to purchase these bonds, when their expected yield satises:
Applying equilibrium condition (18), we conclude that for the bonds to be sold to households, the following must hold: 6 In Arellano (2008) default rate is also constant, it equals 1. In Bi (2012) the value of default rate depends on the properties of distribution of scal limit.
We reach a contradiction.
Thus, when (24) is true, equilibrium with both π t ≤ π max and δ t = 0 does not exist. It follows that under such conditions the government would be forced to default. Analogously to Proposition 1 it can be shown that an equilibrium with π t ≤ π max and δ t = δ only exists if:
We study the topic of existence further in Section 4.1.
Now we can identify the threshold value for the real debt from rule (3) using condition (24):b
Debt that exceeds the thresholdb t is unsustainable when ination is less than π max . Whenever real value of debt exceedsb t , default emerges. Thus, equilibrium default rate is:
provided that an equilibrium exists -condition (25) holds for given {π max ; δ; ε t ; s t−1 ; b t−1 ; R t−1 }.
The probability of default and the risk premium
In this section we study the relationship between the risky interest rate, the probability of default and the risk premium. From equation (26) using equation (19) we obtain a threshold value of scal shock:
Default in period t emerges whenever the realization of scal shock turns out to be smaller thanε t . Note that the value ofε t is known in period t − 1; it goes up as R t−1 /π max (the gross real interest rate on government bonds in case ination reaches π max ) increases. It follows that the central bank can manipulate the threshold value, provided it can alter the risky interest rate or expectations over the upper limit on ination. When the risky interest rate surpasses a certain level, namely R t−1 > βπ max , even positive shocks to scal surpluses can trigger defaults.
In the succeeding analysis we focus on cases in which scal disturbances are always relatively small -to highlight that even when households believe that the range of scal shocks is narrow, they still demand a positive risk premium on government bonds, limiting the central bank's choices. Another motivation for this strategy: when large negative shocks occur, an equilibrium cannot form for valid values of price level and the default rate. Suppose in period t there occurs a scal shock such that ε t < − [ρs t−1 + (1 − ρ)s/(1 − β)]. Then, from equation (18) it follows that in period t household's demand will be non-negative only under a negative price level or a default rate exceeding unity. Thus, from now on we presuppose that ε t ∈ [−ε max ; ε max ], and −ε max > -
for all s t−1 . In Appendix A we provide quantitative estimates for Greek economy, showing that this assumption is realistic. Now we can write down an estimate for the probability of default in period t, calculated in period t − 1:
where f (ε) is the density of the distribution of shock to scal surpluses. From equation (28) it follows that the probability of default depends on the relation between the risky interest rate and the upper limit on ination, R t−1 /π max :
the bigger the value of the gross real interest rate under maximum ination, the higher the probability of default.
Now we can derive the risk premium on government bonds:
The value of the integral on the right-hand side of the last equation is positive. Whenε t = −ε max , the probability of default equals zero and agents do not demand the risk premium. When −ε max <ε t ≤ ε max , the value of the integral is smaller than unity and the risk premium is positive. An increase in R t−1 /π max would lead to an increase in the threshold value of scal shock,ε t , as well as the probability of default and the risk premium.
A qualitative interpretation is as follows. Default emerges when the gap between the real value of debt and the sum of scal surpluses could only be eliminated through ination that exceeds the upper limit; rational households are aware of this regularity. When the upper limit is high enough, the probability of default is relatively low. The higher the risky interest rate, the higher the costs of debt service, the bigger the expected gap between the real value of debt and its backing -the higher the probability of default.
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The central bank's problem: the choice of a risky interest rate
We have characterized the relation between the probability of default and the costs of debt service, R t−1 b t−1 . Since the probability of default depends on R t−1 , the risk premium is determined uniquely for a given value of the risky interest rate. In equilibrium, the central bank sets the risky interest rate, R t−1 , whereas the risk-free rate, R f t−1 , adjusts in accordance with equation (30) which species the risk premium.
Before proceeding, let us verify that all variables from Denition 1 can be determined uniquely and expressed as functions of {b t−1 ; s t−1 ; R t−1 ; π max },
provided that for a given set of {b t−1 ; s t−1 ; R t−1 ; π max } an equilibrium exists.
Knowing s t−1 , we determine s t from equation (1). If for {b t−1 ; s t ; R t−1 ; π max } an equilibrium exists,b t and δ t can be uniquely determined from (27). Knowing δ t , b t−1 , s t , we determine π t using (16) . For given δ t , b t−1 , s t , π t we derive b t from the government budget constraint (2) . The solution to the central bank's problem can be expressed as a function of b t , s t -knowing b t , s t , we determine the risky rate for newly issued bonds, R * t (see Section 4.2). For given R * t , s t , b t the risk premium and R f t can be uniquely determined from (30). Knowing P t−1 , π t , b t we derive B t , P t . Therefore, when an equilibrium exists, all variables from Denition 1 are uniquely determined. Now we are ready to examine how the central bank chooses the risky interest rate. In this section we study the choice of R t−1 and explore the relation between the upper limit on ination, π max , and the probability of default in equilibrium.
Choosing R t−1 in period t−1, the central bank minimizes the expected value of the default rate in period t, E t−1 δ t . Considering that in the event of default the default rate equals δ, this problem can be reduced to minimization of the probability of default in period t:
where :
When the central bank chooses the value of the risky interest rate, it takes into account zero lower bound on the risk-free interest rate given by (33) -a condition obtained by substituting the risk premium from (30) into R f t−1 ≥ 1. Condition (33) ensures that for given {R t−1 ; s t−1 ; b t−1 } the debt b t−1 can be sold to households in period t − 1.
In the following sections we study, for which values of π max and default rate δ the central bank's problem has solutions; we then examine the equilibrium relationship between the probability of default, the default rate δ and the upper limit on ination π max .
The existence of a solution
Let R * t−1 be the solution to the central bank's problem. As shown in Section 3.1, for certain sets of ε t ; π max ; R * t−1 there is no equilibrium with π t ≤ π Suppose in period t scal shock equals the largest negative value, ε t = −ε max . From (18) it follows that the equilibrium ination would satisfy π t ≤ π max if:
Thus, a solution to the central bank's problem satisfying π t ≤ π max will exist for any ε t ∈ [−ε max ; ε max ] , if the risky interest rate in period t-1 complies with condition (34). If it does not comply, then in the event of a large negative shock, ination, which makes up for the gap between the real value of debt and the discounted sum of scal surpluses (corrected for a given δ), will exceed π max .
Restriction π t ≤ π max is satised for all values of scal shock, when:
where e t = δθt−1−ε
At this point we conclude that an equilibrium with ination below π max is feasible when either π max is suciently high, or scal shocks are positive or relatively small. 7 See Appendix B for derivation.
Solution
In this section we solve the central bank's problem. The objective function given by (31) decreases in R t−1 -hence, the solution to (31) is a minimum interest rate satisfying both (32) and (33). Figure 2 illustrates the two constraints; shaded area depicts the case in which both constraints are fullled. Note that these solutions exist for all realizations of a scal shock, if π max ≥ π c .
The function Ψ(R t−1 ) from the right-hand side of condition (33) is increasing in R t−1 :
This function is convex for all R t−1 such thatε t ≤ 0:
In the following analysis we only study equilibria withε t ≤ 0 -that is to say, equilibria in which default can only be caused by negative scal shocks, but not positive ones. From (28) we obtain thatε t ≤ 0 when R *
In equilibrium, the central bank sets R *
Thus, we presuppose that condition (36) is fullled.
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We now determine the values of π max from (36), under which the probability of default is zero. Solutions with a zero probability of default are available, if condition (33) is fullled for R * t−1 = 1: since the objective function decreases in R t−1 , when R * t−1 = 1 is possible, it is an equilibrium solution for which the probability of default is zero, which is the case if:
so that Ψ(1) ≤ 1 (see Figure 2a) . Thus, the probability of default is zero when the upper limit on ination is suciently high. By contrast, when π max < π H , Ψ(1) > 1 (see Figure 2b) . In this case an equilibrium with a zero probability of default does not exist. 8 It follows from Ψ(R t−1 ) being an increasing convex function underεt ≤ 0. 9 When constraint (36) is not fullled, qualitative results do not change, whereas mathematical analysis becomes substantially more complicated.
When inequality (37) holds and R * t−1 = 1, households know that even if ε t = −ε max , default would not emerge because ination that ensures debt sustainability is below π max . Thus, when R * t−1 = 1, the risk premium is zero and the zero lower bound constraint on the risk-free interest rate is fullled. At the same time, the central bank does not have incentives to set R * t−1 > 1 because the corresponding probability of default is higher. Therefore, under (37), R * t−1 = 1 is an equilibrium solution.
When the upper limit on ination is low (π
with a zero probability of default is not feasible. Even if the central bank sets 
s.t. R t−1 ≥ 1;
where the expected threshold value of f iscal shock depends onπ 
As noted before, the bigger the risky interest rate, R t−1 , the higher the expected default rate, E t−1 δ t . The range of R t−1 that satises the zero lower bound restriction for the risk-free rate depends on the risk premium that households demand for government bonds: the lower the risk premium, the lower the minimum value of R t−1 that the central bank can set. At the same time, regardless of the risk premium, the (gross) risky interest rate cannot be lower We draw the following conclusion. When households do not know the exact boundaries of the restriction on ination that the central bank faces, the latter has incentives to create inaccurate beliefs by suggesting that the upper limit on ination is higher than the true value, in order to lower the risk premium and the equilibrium probability of default. On the other hand, when households believe that the upper limit on ination is lower than its actual value, the equilibrium probability of default is higher than in case households' beliefs are accurate.
Another implication of this analysis: when the central bank is committed to mitigating default risks even if it means higher ination, it is sensible to disclose this commitment as early as possible. Such a disclosure would lead to a lower operational decit for the government and allow it to borrow less, leading to a lower probability of default in the future.
Conclusion
In recent years scal stress has become a matter of concern for some of the developed European countries. Governments facing scal limits are unable to exibly adjust their scal policy in line with the requirements for debt sustainability -in these countries scal shocks may lead to an escalation of default risks.
In these circumstances the central bank's policy aects the probability of default on government bonds alongside having an impact on ination. In this paper we studied the capabilities and limitations of monetary policy that controls the risky interest rate in the environment where the central bank strives to minimize the probability of sovereign default while facing restrictions on the upper limit of ination.
We have arrived at the following conclusions. The higher the upper limit on ination, the lower the equilibrium probability of default and the risk premium on government bonds demanded by the market. When the upper limit on ination is set relatively low, an equilibrium with ination below the limit is only feasible when scal shocks are either positive or negative but small. An equilibrium with a zero probability of default is feasible when the upper limit on ination is suciently high; the smaller current scal surpluses, the higher the value of the upper limit on ination that ensures a zero probability of default.
Furthermore, agents' beliefs about the restrictions on ination have a prominent eect on equilibrium outcomes. When the upper limit on ination is believed to be higher than its actual value, the equilibrium probability of default is lower than in case when agents' beliefs reect the true value of the upper limit on ination. When the central bank is committed to mitigating default risks even if it means higher ination, the earlier the public learns about this commitment, the lower the costs of implementing such a policy would be.
Appendix A Table 1 According to The Stability and Growth Pact, the debt to GDP ratio in European countries must not exceed 60 percent. It follows from (19) that to support this level in the long run,b = 60% , the steady-state surplus must equal s = 0, 6%.
We estimate the value of scal shock according to ε t = s t −s − ρ(s t−1 −s). 10 Bi, Traum (2012) calibrate the model with sovereign risks for Greek economy. We follow them in assuming that β = 0, 99 and rely on their results suggesting that mean values of auto-regressive coecients for taxes, transfers and government purchases are 0, 5, 0, 5, 0, 8 respectively. 
